Independence logic, introduced in [5] , cannot be effectively axiomatized. However, first-order consequences of independence logic sentences can be axiomatized. In this article we give an explicit axiomatization and prove that it is complete in this sense. The proof is a generalization of the similar result for dependence logic introduced in [8] .
Introduction
Independence logic [5] is a recent variant of dependence logic that extends first-order logic by formulas
where t i is a tuple of terms. The intuitive meaning of this formula is that the sets of values of t 1 and t 2 are independent of each other for a fixed value of t 3 . Dependence logic [10] adds to first-order logic formulas =(t 1 , . . . , t n )
where t i is a term. Intuitively, this formula says that the values of t 1 , . . . , t n−1 determine the value of t n . As the notions of dependence and independence are not interesting for single assignments, the semantics of these two logics are defined for sets of assignments, called teams. Historically these logics are preceded by partially ordered quantifiers (Henkin quantifiers) of Henkin [6] and Independence-Friendly (IF) logic of Hintikka and Sandu [7] . Dependence logic is a variant of these two and equivalent in expressive power whereas independence logic is a bit more general formalism. Dependence logic sentences can be translated to existential second-order logic (ESO) sentences and vice versa. From the point of view of descriptive complexity theory, this means that dependence logic captures all the classes of models in NP. Still, on the level of formulas, dependence logic is weaker in expressive power than ESO. Dependence logic formulas correspond to the ESO sentences that define a downwards closed class of teams [9] .
This restriction does not apply to independence logic because it is not downwards closed. Galliani has showed that in expressive power independence logic is equivalent to ESO both on the level of formulas and sentences [3] . It follows that all the NP classes of teams are also definable in independence logic.
In this article we consider only first-order consequences of independence logic. The reason for this restriction is that independence logic cannot be effectively axiomatized. In independence logic it is possible to describe infinity. Using this and going a little further, there is an independence logic
Preliminaries
In this section we introduce independence logic (I) and go through some results that are needed in this paper.
At first few remarks on notations are needed. The most important one is that there will not be any notational distinction between tuples and singles. For example, x can refer either to the single variable x or to the tuple of variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ). However, it is always mentioned in the text if we are considering tuples instead of singles at the time. Also if x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y l ) are tuples of variables, then by xy we denote the tuple (x 1 , . . . , x k , y 1 , . . . , y l ). If A and B are sets of tuples, then A ⌢ B denotes the set {ab | a ∈ A and b ∈ B}.
Definition 1. Formulas of I are defined recursively as follows:
1. If φ ∈ FO, then φ ∈ I.
2. If t 1 , t 2 and t 3 are finite (or empty) tuples of terms, then t 1 ⊥ t3 t 2 ∈ I.
3. If φ, ψ ∈ I, then φ ∨ ψ ∈ I and φ ∧ ψ ∈ I.
4. If φ ∈ I and x is a variable, then ∃xφ ∈ I and ∀xφ ∈ I.
So we allow negation only in front of first-order formulas. Also notice that in the independence atom, we allow any t i to be empty. In the case of t 3 = ∅, t 1 ⊥ ∅ t 2 is denoted by t 1 ⊥t 2 .
In order to define the semantics of I, we first need to define the concept of a team. Let M be a model. An assignment s of M is a finite mapping from a set of variables to the domain of M . (In this text M can refer either to the model itself or its domain. It will be always clear from the context which one is under consideration.) Let {x 1 , . . . , x k } be a set of variables. A team X of M with Dom(X) = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is a set of assignments s of M with Dom(s) = {x 1 , . . . , x k }. The value of a term t in an assignment s is denoted by t M s . If t = (t 1 , . . . , t l ) where t i is a term, then by t M s we denote (t M 1 s , . . . , t M l s ). By s(a/x), for a variable x and a ∈ M , we denote the assignment which (with domain Dom(s) ∪ {x}) agrees with s everywhere except that it maps x to a. Then by X(M/x) we denote the duplicated team {s(a/x) | s ∈ X and a ∈ M }. If F : X → P(M ), then X(F/x) denotes to the supplemented team {s(a/x) | s ∈ X and a ∈ F (s)}. Note that it can be the case that X(M/x) = X(F/x).
The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ ∈ I is defined as for first-order logic, except that we now have the new case Fr(t 1 ⊥ t3 t 2 ) = Var(t 1 ) ∪ Var(t 2 ) ∪ Var(t 3 )
where Var(t i ) is the set of variables occurring in the term tuple t i . If Fr(φ) = ∅, then we call φ a sentence. Now we are ready to define the semantics of I. In the definition, M |= s φ refers to the Tarskian satisfaction relation of first-order logic.
Definition 2.
Let M be a model, φ ∈ I and X a team of M such that Fr(φ) ⊆ X. The satisfaction relation M |= X φ is defined as follows:
In the case of t = ∅ occurring in an independence atom, we let
If it is the case that we have to verify a formula of the form ∀x 1 . . . ∀x k φ, then instead of the notation X(M/x 1 ) . . . (M/x k ), we will often use the abbreviation X(M k /x 1 . . . x k ). Also if we have to verify a formula of the form ∃x 1 . . . ∃x k φ, then by the definition, we have to find witnessing functions
Clearly in this case it is equivalent to find a single function F :
If we replace independence atom with one these atoms in Definition 1, then the resulting logic is called dependence logic, inclusion logic or exclusion logic.
Consider first dependence logic. Dependence atom =(t 1 , . . . , t n ) express functional dependence between t n and the tuple t 1 . . . t n−1 , and it can be expressed in independence logic as
For the other direction, there is no translation of independence atom in dependence logic. Dependence logic is downwards closed (meaning that M |= Y φ whenever M |= X φ and Y ⊆ X) whereas independence logic is not. Consider for example independence atom x⊥y. This atom is true for the team x y s 0 0 0
but not for the team x y s 0 0 0
Thus it cannot be expressed in dependence logic, and hence independence logic is expressively strictly stronger on the level of formulas. On the level of sentences though, these logics coincide [5] .
One should also mention that the semantics of all the other dependence logic formulas are not normally defined entirely the same way as we did in Definition 2 for independence logic. There is usually one exception concerning existential formulas. For ∃xφ, it is usually required that each value of the function F : X → P(M ) is singleton. Still, dependence logic is downwards closed with both semantics, and thus with Axiom of Choice, these two definitions coincide.
A direct consequence of the example above is that we cannot adopt the rule ∀xφ ⊢ φ into our inference system because it is not sound for independence logic. If M is a model with domain {0, 1}, and X is the team (4), then X(M/x) is the team (3), and thus M |= X ∀xx⊥y and M |= X x⊥y.
Consider then inclusion and exclusion atoms. Galliani has showed that inclusion/exclusion logic (first-order logic added with inclusion and exclusion atoms) is translatable to independence logic and vice versa [3] . There the following independence logic translation of inclusion atom was presented.
Proposition 5 ([3]
). Let t 1 and t 2 be tuples of terms of the same length. Then the inclusion atom t 1 ⊆ t 2 is equivalent to the independence formula
where v 1 and v 2 are variables and z is a variable tuple of the same length than t i , and none of the variables in v 1 v 2 z occur in t 1 t 2 .
We will use dependence and inclusion atoms in our deduction system, and there every such an occurrence should be understood as an independence logic translation of the form introduced here.
Before going to the proof, one important result need yet to be introduced.
Definition 6.
Let T be a set of formulas of independence logic with only finitely many free variables. The formula φ is a logical consequence of T ,
if for all models M and teams X, with Fr(φ) ∪ ψ∈T Fr(ψ) ⊆ Dom(X), and M |= X T , we have M |= X φ. The formulas φ and ψ are logically equivalent,
if φ |= ψ and ψ |= φ.
Let X be a team with domain {x 1 , . . . , x k } and V ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x k }. By X ↾ V we denote the team {s ↾ V | s ∈ X}. If u is a tuple of variables such that Var(u) = V , then by X ↾ u we denote the team X ↾ V . The following result is important [3] .
Proposition 7 (Locality
For a logic in team semantics setting, this is not an obvious fact. IF logic lacks this property, and the same holds for independence logic if the semantics of ∃xφ is defined in the standard dependence logic way (requiring that the witnessing F maps the assignments of X to singletons of P(M )).
A system of natural deduction
In this section we introduce inference rules that allow us to derive all the first-order consequences of sentences of independence logic. Many of the rules below are just the same than the dependence logic rules introduced in [8] . Still some major differences occur in this system partly due the semantic differences between independence and dependence atomic formulas and partly due the fact that independence logic is not downwards closed.
The rules we are about to adopt are listed below in Figure 3 and in Definition 8. If A is a formula, t is a term and x is a variable, then A(t/x) denotes the formula A where all the free occurrences of x are replaced by t. When using this notation we presume that no variable in t becomes bound in the substitution.
Definition 8.
1. Disjunction substitution:
. . . .
Commutation and associativity of disjunction:
where y is a tuple listing the variables in Fr(A ∨ B) − {x} and the prerequisite for applying this rule is that x does not appear free in B.
Extending scope:
∃xA
where the prerequisite for applying this rule is that x does not appear free in B.
Universal substitution:
∀xA A(y/x) . . . .
B ∀yB
where the prerequisite for applying this rule is that y does not appear free in ∀xA and in any non-discharged assumption used in the derivation of B, except in A(y/x).
Independence distribution: Let
Universal quantifier
Existential quantifier
B B
∃ E Condition 4. 
be formulas where x 0 is a tuple of variables that do not appear in B; x 1 is a tuple of variables that do not appear in A; u i :s, v i :s and w i :s are tuples of bound variables; C and D are first-order formulas.
Let
where α, β, z 0 , z 1 and r are variables that do not appear in formula A ∨ B. Then
Note that the logical form of this rule is
where z is a tuple listing the variables in Fr(A) − {x, y}.
Independence transmission: Let
be formulas where • x j,k :s are variable tuples of same length, y j,k :s are variable tuples of same length, and the variables in these tuples are quantified only once and do not occur free in formula D.
• u i :s, v i :s and w i :s are tuples of variables from y 0,0 .
• C is a quantifier-free first-order formula with variables from x 0,0 y 0,0 .
• e i j,k = e i (x j,k y j,k /x 0,0 y 0,0 ), for e ∈ {u, v, w}.
• C j,k = C(x j,k y j,k /x 0,0 y 0,0 ).
otherwise.
• p ≥ 0 and p
Then we let
A B
9. Identity axiom: If x is a variable, then x = x is an axiom.
10. Identity rule: If x and y are variables, then we let
11. Identity rule: If t is a term and x and y are variables, then we let x = y t(x/y) = t 12. Identity rule: If A is a formula and x and y are variables, then we let
Disjunction elimination rule is not sound for independence logic, so we introduce rules 1-4 for disjunction. These rules are all derivable in first-order logic. Also similar rules for conjunction are easily derivable in this system with an exception that we can derive the correspondent of rule 3 without this new independence atom x⊥y occurring in the derived formula. As mentioned before, universal elimination rule does not hold for independence logic, so we introduce rule 5 here which is also derivable in first-order logic. Rules 3, 4, 6 and 7 preserve logical equivalence.
The Soundness Theorem
In this section we will show that the previous system of natural deduction is sound. First we prove that rules 3, 4, 6 and 7 (plus the conjunctive versions of rules 3 and 4 which are denoted by 3' and 4') preserve logical equivalence. Proof. (3) By locality, it is enough to prove the equivalence for models M and teams X with
There are two options:
For the converse, assume that
(3') Follows from locality of the semantics.
(4') Follows from locality of the semantics.
(7) As above it is enough to prove the equivalence for models M and teams X with Dom(X) = Fr(φ) − {x, y}. Assume first M |= X ∀x∃y(x⊥ z y ∧ φ). Then there is F :
If now b ∈ M is such that there are a ∈ M and s ∈ X with s(a/x)(b/y) ∈ X ′ , then the independence atom guarantees that s(a/x)(b/y) ∈ X ′ for all a ∈ M . Therefore, if we define F ′ : X → P(M ) so that
For the converse, assume that M |= X ∃y∀xφ. Then there is F :
Example 12. Generally it is not true that
On the other hand, we can now see that M X ∀x((ϕ ∧ x⊥y) ∨ ψ).
Lemma 13 (Rule 6).
and 
we have that φ 0 ∨ φ 1 ≡ ϕ.
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts. First we prove that the equivalence holds for models M with |M | = 1 and then for models with larger domain. By locality of the semantics, we can without loss of generality assume that X is always a team with Dom(X) = Fr(φ 0 ∨ φ 1 ). For notational simplicity we can without loss of generality assume that x 0 and x 1 are both of same length l.
Now if we evaluate all the quantified variables in ϕ by the only possible way, we have that
All the independence atoms are trivially true, so M |= X ϕ.
Suppose then M |= X ϕ. Then X extended with values for x 0 , x 1 must have θ 0 or θ 1 true. In either case independence atoms hold trivially, so
2. Suppose now M is a model with |M | > 1 and X is a team. Let 0 and 1 be some distinct members of M .
be functions witnessing this. Now we want to form a function F :
, then M and X ′ satisfy the quantifier-free part of ϕ. First we define sets of tuples as follows: Let s ∈ X(M 2 /αβ). Define A s,z0 = {0} and A s,z1 = {1} and let
Then define
and let
Now it is enough to show that the quantifier-free part of ϕ holds for M and X ′ . So let us go through it part by part:
If they both evaluate r as, say 0, then by the definition of
. If i ≤ m, then this team satisfies u i ⊥ wi v i , and there is an assignment in Y (F Y /x 0 ) agreeing with t for u i w i and with t ′ for v i . Now we can extend it to an assignment t ′′ of X ′ such that t ′′ (r) = 0. Then this t ′′ is as wanted. Suppose i > m. Then all the variables in tuples u i , v i and w i are from tuple x 1 and t(x 1 ) = t ′ (x 1 ) = 0 l . Thus we can choose t ′′ = t.
The case where t(r) = t ′ (r) = 1 is analogous.
• i=0,1 =(z i ): Follows from the definition of F .
•
Assume then that M |= X ϕ and let F :
we have that the quantifier-free part of ϕ is true for M and X ′ . Now define
It is enough to show that
and
For (16) 
. By the definition of F Y , these assignments are extended by some t, t ′ ∈ X ′ such that t(r) = t(z 0 ) and t
and hence s ′′ is as wanted.
Then let us show that M |= Y (FY /x) θ 0 . Consider this extension t of s such that t(r) = t(z 0 ). First notice that α = β cannot hold in whole X ′ because α and β were universally quantified and |M | > 1. Therefore, for some assignment in X ′ , ¬z 0 = z 1 holds. But in X ′ z 0 and z 1 are constants, so ¬z 0 = z 1 holds in whole X ′ . Hence t(r) = t(z 1 ), and so t belongs to the part of X ′ where θ 0 ∧ r = z 0 holds. Therefore M |= s θ 0 , and because θ 0 is first-order, we have by
The proof of (17) is analogous. Hence M |= X φ 0 ∨ φ 1 .
Notice that in the previous lemma parameters α and β were needed only for the case |M | = 1. If we forget these trivial models, rule 6 can be simplified.
Before going to the soundness proof, we need the following lemma. Recall that the notation φ(x i1 /x 1 ) . . . (x in /x n ) presumes that none of the variables x i1 , . . . , x in become bound in the substitution.
Lemma 18 (Change of free variables). Let the free variables of φ be x 1 , . . . , x n . Let i 1 , . . . , i n be distinct. If X is a team with Dom(X) = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, let X ′ consist of the assignments
Proof. Easy induction on the complexity of the formula.
Proposition 19. Let T ∪ {ψ} be a set of formulas of independence logic. If
Proof. We will prove this claim by induction on the length of derivation. First notice that the previous lemmas provide the soundness of rules 3, 4, 6 and 7. Rules 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, ∧ I, ∧ E, ∨ I and ¬ E are obviously sound. Also rules ∨ E, ¬ I, ∀ I, ∃ I and ∃ E are identical to the corresponding rules in the dependence logic case and the proof for these goes the same way as in [8] . Rule ∀ E is restricted version of the corresponding dependence logic rule and also here the proof introduced in [8] suffices. We are then left to prove induction steps for rules 5 and 8 only. 
be formulas where -x j,k :s are variable tuples of same length and y j,k :s are variable tuples of same length.
-Variables in these tuples are quantified only once and do not occur free in formula D. -C is a quantifier-free first-order formula with variables from x 0,0 y 0,0 .
-e i j,k = e i (x j,k y j,k /x 0,0 y 0,0 ), for e ∈ {u, v, w}.
-C j,k = C(x j,k y j,k /x 0,0 y 0,0 ).
Assume that we have a natural deduction proof of B from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k } with last rule 8 and last formula A preceding B in the proof. Let M and X be such that M |= X A i for i = 1, . . . , k. By the assumption, we have a shorter proof of A from the assumptions {A 1 , . . . , A k }. So by the induction assumption, M |= X A. Also variables in tuples x j,k and y j,k , for j = 0, 1 and k = −1, . . . , p ′ , do not occur free in A and B, so we can without loss of generality assume that these variables are not in Dom(X). Let r and r ′ be the lengths of tuples x 0,0 and y 0,0 , respectively. Then there is a function F :
It suffices to show that
We will first define a function
, then M and Y satisfy the part of the conjunction that have no variables from tuples x 1,j , y 1,j , for j = p + 1, . . . , p ′ , occurring free in it. So we want that Then we let
By the construction, Y ↾ x 1,−1 y 1,−1 consist of functions x 1,−1 → s(x 0,0 ), y 1,−1 → s(y 0,0 ) where s ∈ X ′ ↾ x 0,0 y 0,0 . By Lemma 18,
By the construction,
and thus by the third conjunct of (20) and Lemma 18,
Also from (22) and the second conjunct of (20), it follows by the construction of Y that
Now it suffices to show that there is G :
Let s ∈ Y and consider the last conjunct of the formula. Notice that the set
Because of this and (23) and the first conjunct of (21), it is possible to extend s up to x 1,p ′ y 1,p ′ in such a way that
holds. We just pick the values of x 1,l y 1,l , for p < l ≤ p ′ , from Y ↾ x 1,−1 y 1,−1 . This construction method guarantees that this extended assignment satisfies
also. Clearly the required G is now definable. We do not even need Axiom of Choice here because we can define G(s) as the set of tuples
where the assignment s(a i b i /x 1,i y 1,i ), for i = p + 1, . . . , p ′ , satisfies (24) and the assignments t(
The Completeness Theorem
In this section we will show that using our system of natural deduction we can derive all the firstorder consequences of sentences of independence logic. Our proof is analogous to the proof of the corresponding dependence logic theorem in Kontinen and Väänänen [8] which in turn builds on the earlier work of Barwise [1] by using first-order approximations in the completeness proof.
5.1
The roadmap for the proof 1 . First we will show that from any independence logic sentence φ it is possible to derive an equivalent sentence of the form φ ′ = ∀x∃y(
where x and y are tuples of variables where each variable is quantified only once; u i , v i and w i are tuples of existentially quantified variables and θ is a quantifier-free first-order formula.
2. The sentence φ ′ can be shown to be equivalent, in countable models, to the game expression 
. .))).
In the game expression, Ψ 0 := θ 0,0 , and for n ≥ 1,
where • x j,k and x are tuples of same length and y j,k and y are tuples of same length such that each variable in these tuples is quantified only once,
• e i n,j = e i (x n,j y n,j /xy) for e ∈ {u, v, w},
otherwise ,
The idea behind the game expression is that at level n, x n,−n y n,−n introduces a new tuple of M , tuples x n,i y n,i , for i = −n + 1, . . . , p n−1 , copy all the tuples introduced at the previous level and tuples x n,i y n,i , for i = p n−1 + 1, . . . , p n , confirm that the independence atoms hold between all the tuples x n,i y n,i and x n,j y n,j where −n ≤ i, j ≤ p n−1 .
3. The game expression Φ can be approximated by the first-order formulas . . . . . . ∀x n,−n ∃y n,−n ∃x n,−n+1 ∃y n,−n+1 . . . ∃x n,pn ∃y n,pn (Ψ n ) . . .))).
4. Then we will show that these approximations can all be deduced from φ ′ .
5. Then we note that for recursively saturated (or finite) models M , it holds that
6. At last we show that for any T ⊆ I and φ ∈ FO:
Suppose T φ. If T * consist of the first-order approximations of sentences of T , then T * φ and T * ∪ {¬φ} is deductively consistent in first-order logic. Taking some countable recursively saturated model of T * ∪ {¬φ}, we have a model of T ∪ {¬φ} and hence T |= φ.
From φ to φ

′
In this section we are going to prove that from φ one can derive an equivalent formula φ ′ of the form ∀x∃y(
where x and y are tuples of variables where each variable is quantified only once; u i , v i and w i are tuples of existentially quantified variables and θ is a quantifier-free first-order formula. Proof. We will prove the claim in several steps. Without loss of generality we may assume that in φ each variable is quantified only once.
Step 1 We derive from φ an equivalent sentence in prenex normal form
where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀} and θ is a quantifier-free formula.
We will prove this for every formula φ satisfying the assumption made in the beginning of the proof and the assumption that no variable appears both free (if φ has free variables) and bound in the formula. Now if φ is atomic or first-order formula, then the claim clearly holds. (In the latter case we know that our deduction system covers the natural first-order deduction system and in that system we can derive an equivalent formula in prenex normal form.) Also the cases of universal and existential quantifications are trivial. So we need only to consider the cases of disjunction and conjunction. We prove these cases by simultaneous induction.
We can use the induction assumption in the deduction because x ij :s are all different from each other and none of them are in tuple y. This concludes the proof for the case n = 0.
The last step can be done if we interpret the second formula as φ(s n+1 /y n+1 ) for
Using n times rule ∃E, once D5 and n times rule ∃I, we can derive
So from θ one can derive
which is clearly equivalent to θ and of the required form.
Assume then that θ = φ ∨ ψ. By the induction assumption, we have derivations φ ⊢ I φ * and ψ ⊢ I ψ * where
such that φ ≡ φ * , ψ ≡ ψ * , φ 0 and ψ 0 are quantifier-free first-order formulas, y i and y ′ i , for i = 1, 2, are tuples of bound variables such that none of these variables occur in both formulas or are quantified more than once, e i is a tuple of existentially quantified variables for e ∈ {u, v, w, u
First we show by induction on the length of y 1 that from φ * ∨ ψ * one can derive an equivalent formula of the form
where φ 1 and ψ 1 are quantifier-free first-order formulas, y 3 and y 3 are tuples of bound variables such that none of these variables are quantified more than once or occur free in the formula, e i is a tuple of existentially quantified variables for e ∈ {u, v, w, u
Assume first that len(y 1 ) = 0. We show this case by induction on the length of y 1.
where D6 is the derivation 1 and D7) 4. .
.
6. .
∀y
where D7 is the derivation
Here we use ∧ E and ∧ I and deduce the second conjunct as we deduced (33) previously.) 6. .
.
8. .
∀y
, ∧ I and ∧ E, we can drag the quantifiers to the left side of the formula and rearrange the quantifier-free part as we want.)
This concludes the proof of this case.
Suppose then len(y 1 ) = n + 1. Let y 1 = xy 4 where len(y 4 ) = n and let y be a tuple listing the free variables in φ * ∨ ψ * . The following deduction shows the claim
where D8 is the derivation
where D9 is a derivation similar to D7. This concludes the claim.
Consider then the existential part of (36) which is the formula
With one application of rule 6 we can derive from (37) an equivalent formula θ ′ of the form
So together we can derive from (36) an equivalent formula of the required form
This concludes the proof of the case θ = φ ∨ ψ.
Suppose then θ = φ ∧ ψ. By the induction assumption, φ ⊢ I φ * and ψ ⊢ I ψ * where φ * and ψ * are as in (34) and (35). Now θ ⊢ I φ * ∧ ψ * , and using rule 5 and the first-order rules for ∃ and ∧, it is possible to derive from φ * ∧ ψ * an equivalent formula of the required form
Remembering items (3') and (4') in Lemma 11, it is obvious that the formulas are equivalent. This concludes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3 The deductions in Step 1 and 2 (from φ to (28) and from θ to (31)) can be combined to show that
Step 4 At last we can derive an equivalent formula of the form (26) from the formula (38) above. Using rule 7 we can swap the places of existential and universal quantifiers which sit next to each other. Every swap gives us some new independence atom which we can push to conjunction
Pushing every universal quantifier in front of the formula and the new independence atoms to the quantifier-free part, we have a formula which is almost of the required form; every new independence atom has still variables that are not existentially quantified. We omit the proof of this part here because it is essentially the same than the proof of Step 4 in [8] . Only exceptions are that rule 7 is the independence logic version of the similar dependence logic rule and in place of ∀ E and ∀ I we use rule 5. After finishing this part we replace all the universally quantified variables in these new independence atoms as existentially quantified variables. This can be done easily just as we did it in Step 2 in the case of independence atoms.
Steps 1-4 show that from a sentence φ a logically equivalent sentence of the form (26) can be deduced.
Derivation of the approximations φ n
In the previous section we proved that from every sentence φ we can derive a logically equivalent sentence of the form ∀x∃y(
where x and y are tuples of variables; u i , v i and w i are tuples of existentially quantified variables and θ is a quantifier-free first-order formula. Next we will show that the approximations Φ n of the game expression Φ corresponding to the sentence (39) can be deduced from it.
The formulas Φ and Φ n are defined as follows.
Definition 40. Let φ be the formula (39). For j, k ∈ Z and 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we let: -x and x j,k be variable tuples of same length and y and y j,k be variable tuples of same length such that each variable occurs at most once in these tuples.
-θ j,k = θ(x j,k y j,k /xy) and e i j,k = e i (x j,k y j,k /xy) for e ∈ {u, v, w}.
Also for n ≥ 1, we let Ψ n be the following formula:
In the case n = 0, we let Ψ 0 = θ 0,0 .
• The infinitary formula Φ is now defined as: . . .))).
• The n:th approximation Φ n of φ is defined as: . . . ∀x n,−n ∃y n,−n ∃x n,−n+1 ∃y n,−n+1 . . . ∃x n,pn ∃y n,pn (Ψ n ) . . .))).
Next we will show that φ ⊢ I Φ n for natural numbers n.
Theorem 41. Let φ and Φ n be as in definition (40) . Then φ ⊢ I Φ n for all n ≥ 0.
Proof. First let
x n,i y n,i ⊆ x n,−n y n,−n .
Notice that
We will prove a bit stronger claim saying that φ ⊢ Ω n where Ω n is defined otherwise as Φ n except that in the last line we also have the formula Υ n . So we let Ω n be of the form . . . ∀x n,−n ∃y n,−n ∃x n,−n+1 ∃y n,−n+1 . . . ∃x n,pn ∃y n,pn (Υ n ∧ Ψ n ) . . .))).
It is not hard to see that we can deduce Φ n from Ω n so proving this claim suffices. We prove the claim by induction on n. For n = 0 the claim holds, since φ = Ω 0 . Suppose then φ ⊢ I Ω h and n = h + 1. By the induction assumption, it is enough to show that Ω n can be deduced from Ω h . So let us first consider the last line of Ω h which is the following formula:
If we interpret θ as C and
as D (in the case h = 0 we interpret D as empty) we have that
Now with one application of rule 8 we can derive from (42) the formula
∀x n,−n ∃y n,−n ∃x n,−n+1 ∃y n,−n+1 . . . ∃x n,pn ∃y n,pn
x n,i y n,i ⊆ x n,−n y n,−n −n≤i≤pn
But this formula is just the same than ∀x h,−h ∃y h,−h ∃x h,−h+1 ∃y h,−h+1 . . . ∃x h,p h ∃y h,p h (Ψ h ∧ (43) ∀x n,−n ∃y n,−n ∃x n,−n+1 ∃y n,−n+1 . . . ∃x n,pn ∃y n,pn (Υ n ∧ Ψ n )).
Now we can easily derive Ω n from Ω h . First we use repeatedly rules ∃ E, ∧ E and the "elimination" part of rule 5 in order to reach the last line of Ω h , namely (42), then from it we deduce (43) with one application of rule 8, and then for the reverse direction we use rules ∃ I, ∧ I and the "introduction" part of rule 5 to get the formula Ω n .
Back from approximations
Proposition 44. Let φ be as in (39) and Φ as in (40) . Then φ |= Φ and in countable models Φ |= φ.
Proof. Assume that M |= φ. We show M |= Φ. The truth of Φ in M means that there is a winning strategy for player II in the following game
where a n,i , b n,i are tuples chosen from M and player II wins if the assignment s(x n,i ) = a n,i , s(y n,i ) = b n,i satisfies Ψ n in (40) for all n. Let x and y be tuples of sizes r and r ′ , respectively. Since M |= φ, there is a function F :
We will now construct a winning strategy for player II recursively so that for each round n the assignment s(x) = a n,i , s(y) = b n,i is in X.
• If n = 0 and player I has played a 0,0 , then player II chooses b 0,0 to be any member of F (s) where s(x) = a 0,0 . The assignment s(x) = a 0,0 , s(y) = b 0,0 is in X and M |= X θ. Thus the assignment s(x 0,0 ) = a 0,0 , s(y 0,0 ) = b 0,0 satisfies θ 0,0 = Ψ 0 .
• Suppose then n = h + 1 and tuples a h,i and b h,i have been played in the previous round successfully by player II and so that every assignment s(x) = a h,i , s(y) = b h,i is in X. First player I chooses some tuple a n,−n . Then player II chooses b n,−n to be some member of F (s), for s(x) = a n,−n , as above. Then II chooses a n,i = a h,i and b h,i = b h,i for −h ≤ i ≤ p h . By the construction and the assumption, the assignment s(x n,i ) = a n,i , s(y n,i ) = b n,i satisfies −n≤i≤p h θ n,i ∧ −n+1≤i≤pn−1
x n,i y n,i = x n−1,i y n−1,i .
Now for each a n,i b n,i which have already been played i.e. the pairs with −n ≤ i ≤ p h , there is some assignment in X corresponding to it. So for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m and −n ≤ j, k ≤ p h , if s(w 
is of size p n − p h , so player II can play each remaining a n,i and b n,i as some t(x) and t(y) for some appropriate t ∈ X so that the formula 
holds for the assignment s(x n,i ) = a n,i , s(y n,i ) = b n,i . Then by (45) and the construction,
holds for s and thus M |= s Ψ n .
Hence there is a winning strategy for player II. Suppose then M is a countable model of Φ. We let a i,−i , i < ω, be an enumeration of M r . We play the game G(M, Φ) letting player I play the sequence a n,−n as his n:th move. Let s be the assignment determined by the play where player II follows her winning strategy. Let X be the team consisting of the assignments t(x) = s(x n,i ), t(y) = s(y n,i ), for n < ω, −n ≤ i ≤ p n . Every formula θ n,i holds for s, so M |= X θ.
Suppose t, t ′ ∈ X and t(w i ) = t ′ (w i ) (or w i is empty) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then t and t ′ correspond to some a n,j b n,j and a n ′ ,k b n ′ ,k . If h = max{n, n ′ }+1, then a n,j b n,j = a h,j b h,j , a n ′ ,k b n ′ ,k = a h,k b h,k and −h ≤ j, k ≤ p h−1 . Because s satisfies the last conjunct of Ψ h i.e. the formula The team X can now be presented as {∅}(M r /x)(F/y) for F (t) = {b n,i | t(x) = a n,i , n < ω, −n ≤ i ≤ p n } where F (t) is always non-empty for t ∈ {∅}(M r /x). Hence M |= φ.
Next we will define a concept of a recursively saturated model that will be important for our proof. whenever {φ n (x, y) | n ∈ N} is recursive.
The following proposition is needed.
Proposition 48 ([2]). For every infinite model M , there is a recursively saturated countable model M
An example and open questions
In this section we go through an example and a couple of open questions regarding this topic.
Example 52. This is an example of using independence introduction rule in a context of uniformly continuous functions.
1. For every ǫ > 0 there is δ > 0 such that for every x, y, if |x − y| < δ, then |f (x) − f (y)| < ǫ.
2. Therefore, for every ǫ > 0 and x there is δ > 0 such that x and δ are independent of each other for fixed ǫ, and for every y, if |x − y| < δ, then |f (x) − f (y)| < ǫ.
At the end we have some open questions.
• Is it possible to generalize our axiomatization so that it would cover all the first-order consequences of independence logic formulas? If we want to use first-order approximations in our proof, we would perhaps want to construct these approximations in a way that they would not have any new relation symbols in them.
• Suppose we have only independence atoms of the form t 1 ⊥t 2 in our syntax. Is there a similar deductive system for this syntactical restriction? Very recently Galliani has showed in his notes that this non-relativized independence logic is expressively as strong as the relativized version.
• Our deduction system is still relatively weak. Can we somehow improve it in order to get for example all the atomic consequences of independence atomic formulas? In principle this should be possible because these independence atoms are essentially first-order expressions.
